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To assess community needs for public information dur-
ing a bioterrorism-related crisis, we simulated an intention-
al Rift Valley fever outbreak in a community in the southern
part of the United States. We videotaped a series of simu-
lated print and television “news reports” over a fictional 9-
day crisis period and invited various groups (e.g., first-
responders and their spouses or partners, journalists) with-
in the selected community to view the videotape and
respond to questions about their reactions. All responses
were given anonymously. First-responders and their spous-
es or partners varied in their reactions about how the crisis
affected family harmony and job performance. Local jour-
nalists exhibited considerable personal fear and confusion.
All groups demanded, and put more trust in, information
from local sources. These findings may have implications
for risk communication during bioterrorism-related out-
breaks.
H
uman behavior during disasters (e.g., hurricanes,
fires, mass shootings, airplane crashes) has been stud-
ied by historians as well as behavioral and social scientists,
and disaster management teams make assumptions on the
basis of these studies (1–11). However, with bioterrorism
(intentional release of biological, chemical, or radiologic
agents), the standard sensory cues (location, beginning and
end of crisis) are not available; therefore, a different “emo-
tional valence” may be involved. The standard models
used as predictors of human behavior during crises may
not be adequate. We simulated a bioterrorism-related out-
break in a U.S. community to examine (prospectively) the
community’s reaction to the crisis and assess the need for
public information. 
Methods
We simulated the intentional aerosolized release of Rift
Valley fever virus (RVFV) in a semirural community (pop-
ulation 300,000) in the southern part of the United States.
The community was selected because its mosquito popula-
tion could support transmission of RVFV. We videotaped a
series of simulated print and television (local, network, and
cable) “news reports” over a fictional 9-day crisis period.
The 83-minute videotape told the story of the intentional
disease outbreak. We invited four groups (medical first-
responders, medical first-responder spouses or partners,
journalists, and others) within the selected community to
view the videotape and answer questions about their reac-
tions. These four groups knew that the outbreak was fic-
tional. We then tabulated and analyzed the responses.
The Video
The story of the simulated outbreak unfolded in a series
of video reports from federal and local governments and
the news media (Appendix 1, online only, available from:
URL: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9no6/02-0769_
app1.htm). Health agency news bulletins were provided by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; news
reports by television reporters or news anchors; and com-
munity reports by local officials, including the mayor. The
reports began with recognition in the community of an
unusual infection affecting humans and certain farm ani-
mals and continued during the next 9 days with an epi-
demiologic investigation and the identification by federal
authorities of intentional release of RVFV. Reports includ-
ed a detailed press conference by federal health authorities
describing routes of transmission, prevention measures,
signs and symptoms of infection, and medical manage-
ment of the disease. The news conference, held in the state
capital the day after the presence of RVFV infection in the
United States was announced, was immediately followed
by a panel discussion (by nongovernment experts) on
RVFV. Differences of opinion on clinical, epidemiologic,
and biological issues among RVFV experts were reported. 
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agement (e.g., the effectiveness of the antiviral drug rib-
avirin, the need for RVFV vaccine, and who should receive
the vaccine) and over the potential for infected persons to
serve as reservoirs and carriers of the virus elsewhere dur-
ing the few days when viral titers are especially high.
Governors of adjoining states questioned the adequacy of
mosquito-control and animal quarantine measures, given
the lack of a control model for the spread of RVFV infec-
tion in industrialized countries. Although official quaran-
tine measures were not taken, final video reports showed a
gradual de facto isolation of the city. 
The Questionnaire
The questionnaire (Appendix 2, online only, available
from: URL: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9no6/02-
0769_app2.htm), which included multiple-choice, open-
ended questions, and opportunities for additional com-
ments, was distributed to all participants. Questions
addressed job abandonment, quarantine compliance,
demand for drugs and vaccine, information requirements,
and other issues of community interest. Six sets of ques-
tions were posed to the participants during the video pres-
entation. Set 1 was given after a disease of unknown eti-
ology affecting humans and some farm animals was rec-
ognized in the community. These questions focused on
willingness to remain at work, the types and sources of
information that influenced the decision to work or not
work, and actions regarding families and loved ones. Set
2 was given after the disease was identified as RVFV
infection, federal health authorities briefed the public
about this infection at a press conference, and a panel of
nongovernment experts discussed the disease on televi-
sion. These questions tested the participants’ understand-
ing of RVFV routes of transmission and preventive meas-
ures and the participants’ satisfaction with information
from government and nongovernment sources. Sets 3 and
4 followed a period of growing confusion and anxiety
caused by changing and sometimes conflicting “authori-
tative” statements and tested participants’ requests for
medication, including ribavirin (Set 3), and for RVFV
vaccine (Set 4). Set 5, given after the participants learned
that the outbreak of RVFV was intentional, reassessed
decisions and actions regarding job and family concerns
and information needed to make these decisions. Set 6
followed a period of increasing anxiety over a now-con-
firmed bioterrorism-related outbreak that could spread to
humans and cattle in the state and in adjoining states, over
the ability of the government to stop the spread of the
infection, and over the de facto isolation of the communi-
ty. These questions surveyed participants’ reactions to
rumors of possible quarantine and to sources of informa-
tion deemed reliable and influential in decision making
now that the threat had become more complicated, per-
sonal, and disruptive. 
Participants
Four study groups, totaling 153 community residents,
were formed. A goal of at least 30 participants per group
was dictated by budgetary factors. The number of candi-
dates contacted to assemble groups of at least 30 partici-
pants followed guidelines from marketing study groups
(Harwell Productions, pers. comm.). One hundred thirty-
eight medical first-responders (responders) were invited
to participate in one study group; 58 responded to our
invitation, 45 registered, and 38 attended. Reflecting the
make-up of medical first-responders in the community,
one third of the group’s participants were fire department
emergency medical services personnel, and two thirds
were emergency department personnel (nurses, physi-
cians, technicians) from the area’s major medical centers.
Eighty-three spouses or partners of responders (hereafter
termed spouses) were invited to form a second study
group; 47 responded, 44 registered, and 32 attended.
Fifty-seven members of the local print and TV news
media (hereafter, termed the media) were invited to a third
study group; 50 responded, 42 registered, and 34 attend-
ed. Three hundred fifty invitations were sent to rank-and-
file residents of the community (hereafter termed resi-
dents) to form a final study group. Twenty-three invita-
tions were returned by the U.S. Postal Service as undeliv-
erable; 73 responded, 46 registered, and 47 attended (1
registered participant failed to appear, but 2 invitees who
had not registered arrived and participated). 
Names of persons invited to participate in the first
three groups were drawn blindly from rosters of eligible
candidates prepared by their employers. Rosters of eligi-
ble candidates for the residents category were prepared
from census tract data and cross-indexed telephone books
(Table).
Sex and age distributions within the four study groups
were representative of the population segments from
which their members were drawn, as were the educational
levels of the responder, spouse, and media groups. The
educational distribution of residents was not representative
of the metropolitan area; those who chose to participate in
this group had more formal education than area residents
in general. According to 2000 census data for this area,
24.2% of the population have no high school diploma or
equivalency, 30.2% are high school graduates, 22.4% have
some college education, 12.7% have either an associate or
full college degree, and 6.1% have graduate or profession-
al degrees. We asked all participants if they had family
members and loved ones in the area to assess potential
conflict in job loyalty versus safety of one’s family and
loved ones during a disaster. The media group was unique
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Results 
When asked about the transmission of RVFV, 30% to
35% of all group participants knew that the virus is trans-
mitted by mosquitoes and not from person to person.
RVFV transmission information was given by federal
authorities at the televised press conference, as well as by
academic experts interviewed on television after the press
conference. The largest group who thought the risk for per-
son-to-person transmission was “considerable” was
responders. None of the participants was satisfied to
receive information from federal authorities only. Most
participants wanted additional information from local pub-
lic health authorities, and 48% to 75% wanted information
from both government and nongovernment sources.
In all four groups, participants who expressed interest
in nonmedically indicated antibiotic or ribavirin treatment
were in the minority. The largest minority to demand such
medications was in the group of spouses; however, the
demanded medication was primarily for their first-respon-
der companions, not for themselves. In all four groups,
approximately 50% of participants said that they would
compete for RVFV vaccine for themselves and their fami-
lies; the largest demand came from the media. When asked
if they would demand vaccine for themselves as a quid pro
quo for remaining on the job during the crisis, 26% of
responders said they would, and 21% said they were
uncertain. Sixty-three percent of spouses said they would
want their mates to demand vaccine.
Reacting to rumors of quarantine (not to an official
quarantine announcement), 59% of media and 75% of res-
idents said they would comply and not try to leave; 6% of
residents and 13% of spouses said they would try to leave
regardless of consequences; 4% of residents and 15% of
media said they would obey but try to leave if necessary.
In all groups, most participants stated that their willingness
to comply would increase if they were assured that quaran-
tine was absolutely necessary and that it would work. In all
groups, a majority faulted federal authorities for holding
the joint press conference in the state capital, rather than at
the scene of the outbreak 250 miles away. 
Early in the simulated outbreak, before the disease was
identified and its implications were known, pluralities in
all groups wanted health information from local public
health authorities. Responders wanted the information
delivered within the chain of command at work; ranking
second as the desired source of this information for all
groups, except responders, was the private physician.
After the disease was identified and terrorism was deter-
mined the cause, no single source of information at any
level was chosen as desirable by any majority. Small plu-
ralities in each group chose as the most reliable source of
information “the head of the federal team working at the
outbreak site,” “the President,” “a physician from a feder-
al agency,” or “other.” When asked whom the participants
considered most influential in decisions they would make
about work, family, and themselves, once again no single
authority figure emerged as the majority’s selection in any
group. Selections with small pluralities were “family and
loved ones,” “the President,” and “the head of the federal
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Table. Study group characteristics, simulated bioterrorism incident 
  Responders (N=39) no. (%)  Spouses (N=32) no. (%)  Media (N=34) no. (%)  Residents (N=48) no. (%) 
Sex         
Male  24 (61.5)  12 (37.5)  21 (61.8)  22 (45.8) 
Female  15 (38.5)  20 (62.5)  13 (38.2)  26 (54.2) 
Age         
18–26  7 (17.9)  6 (18.8)  4 (11.8)  4 (8.3) 
27–50  30 (76.9)  22 (68.8)  23 (67.6)  19 (39.6) 
51–65  2 (5.1)  3 (9.4)  6 (17.6)  11 (22.9) 
>65    1 (3.1)  1 (2.9)  14 (29.2) 
Family members in area         
Yes  38 (97.4)  31 (96.9)  22 (64.7)  44 (91.7) 
No      12 (35.3)  4 (8.3) 
No response  1 (2.6)  1 (3.1)     
Education         
Not high school graduate    1 (3.1)    1 (2.1) 
High school diploma/ 
equivalency 
7 (17.9)  8 (25.0)    6 (12.5) 
Some college  15 (38.5)  18 (56.3)  5 (14.7)  16 (33.3) 
College degree  13 (33.3)  3 (9.4)  25 (73.5)  16 (33.3) 
Post-graduate education  4 (10.3)  1 (3.1)  3 (8.8)  7 (14.6) 
No response    1 (3.1)     
  Other      1 (3.0)  2 (4.2) team working at the outbreak site.” Half the participants in
all groups chose “other.” Within “other,” 34% of the par-
ticipants chose another federal medical or nonmedical
official, 4% chose state officials, 5% chose national (not
local) media, 11% said they did not know at that time in
the outbreak who would be most influential in their per-
sonal decision making, and 47% chose local leaders,
including government and nongovernment officials.
The media indicated they would turn to a variety of
local sources for their assignments. Most of these sources
were professors in the local medical school, but other
sources included the reporters’ personal physicians and
veterinarians.
Most participants in all four study groups indicated they
would remain on the job throughout the crisis. Initially,
when the outbreak of an as-yet-unknown disease in the
area was recognized, 97% of responders, 94% of media,
and 77% of residents said they would remain at work; 11%
of residents opted not to work, and the remainder said they
were students, unemployed, or retired. Ninety-one percent
of spouses said they would encourage their mates to con-
tinue working.
After the disease was identified and the outbreak was
recognized as an act of bioterrorism, 95%, 71%, and 65%
of responders, media, and residents, respectively, said they
would continue working, and 78% of spouses said they
would want their mates to remain on the job. In all groups,
most participants said they would continue to work, pro-
vided that they received information about medical issues
(particularly transmission and prevention), their work sites
were adequately protected, and the community were
unlikely to be exposed to another act of bioterrorism.
Seventy-seven percent of media said that if their work put
them at risk, they would expect their employers to provide
protective measures (from insecticides to vaccine) and
necessary medication and treatment. 
Just before conclusion of the video, responders and
spouses were asked how important it was to reach agree-
ment with their partners on whether to stay at work, seek
medicines, and send family members out of town. Twenty-
six percent of responders said that concurrence would be
essential, whereas 53% of spouses thought such agreement
was essential.
Discussion and Conclusions 
The study was based on a simulated outbreak; there-
fore, the participants’reactions were to a simulated, not an
actual, crisis. For budgetary reasons, we could not recruit
and compensate sufficient numbers of community resi-
dents to provide a statistical sample of the populations
from which they were drawn; therefore, as with some
forms of market research, participants’ answers to ques-
tions reflect their opinions and not those of their peers.
Sample bias may have resulted from the absence of per-
sons invited to participate who declined to do so; this may
be especially important among residents, whose underedu-
cated members were underrepresented. The choice of
RVFV as the disseminated agent may have muted the
responses of the participants because it has a relatively low
death rate (1% to 10%) and does not have the high “fear
factor” of some other diseases such as smallpox. Finally,
the community we chose has its own customs, traditions,
and ways of coping with a crisis that may not be shared by
communities elsewhere.
Some participant reactions in this simulated-outbreak
study are of particular interest. For example, disagree-
ments between responders and spouses over reporting for
duty during the crisis and demands for vaccine as quid pro
quo for staying on the job could influence staffing levels
and responder job performance in an actual bioterrorism-
related outbreak. Risk communication messages may need
to be crafted, tailored to the needs and concerns of first-
responders and families, and delivered separately.
Journalists are key participants in risk communication
(12–16), yet in this study, the media exhibited more fear
than any group other than spouses, made high demands for
vaccine, had the poorest understanding of medical issues
associated with RVFV, and were most likely to stay away
from work after terrorism was recognized. Had this been
an actual bioterrorism-related outbreak, the media might
not have served effectively as conduits of information to
the public because they had not been adequately educated
to eliminate confusion and dispel fear about their personal
safety.
Participants in this study were not unique in their wari-
ness of sole-source information, however authoritative or
expert (17–20). Members of the actual community in
which the simulated bioterrorism-related outbreak
occurred wanted information from varied sources, even if
the sources they mentioned differed in quality and reliabil-
ity. Their reactions suggest that bioterrorism training
should include information management for risk commu-
nicators and public affairs officers who have the responsi-
bility of providing timely and accurate information to dis-
pel the “fog” of rumors and misinformation present during
the aftermath of an intentional disease outbreak.
Journalists and other media specialists should participate
actively in scenarios and other similar exercises to gain
insight into the complexity of information management in
a bioterrorism-related crisis. 
As the simulated outbreak became more complicated
and personally threatening, participants indicated a prefer-
ence for information from local government and non-
government sources or from federal officials at the out-
break site. Recognized, respected community leaders (e.g.,
private physicians, government and nongovernment offi-
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ed crisis, just as they do in other crises. Training in the
strategy and tactics of risk communication (21–24) should
be expanded to include them. In an actual bioterrorism-
related outbreak, these local leaders, supported by federal
health authorities, should take the lead in communicating
with local residents. 
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